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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the liquidation provisions of the Companies Act 
1993, in order to ascertain how effective those provisions are in 
protecting the rights of creditors of companies in liquidation. In 
particular, it focuses on the relationship between the liquidator and the 
creditors, and the impact of the reforms on that relationship. 
The writer concludes that the reforms will bring New Zealand into a 
unique position among Commonwealth countries, all of which have 
recently reviewed their insolvency regimes, and all of whom have 
elected to retain the multiple process system. It is considered that the 
reforms are not consistently worked through in the new legislation. It 
is also argued that the removal of the ability of courts and creditors to 
sanction the actions of liquidators will result in a considerable 
reduction in the protection afforded to creditors. In addition, it is 
argued that the position of secured creditors has been significantly 
eroded. The writer's overall conclusion is that the reforms are 
prejudicial to the interests of creditors. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 15,000 words. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the shadow of controversial reforms such as increased directors' 
duties and the ability of companies to purchase their own shares, 
changes enacted in the Companies Act 1993 to the liquidation regime 
applying to companies have escaped the glare of extensive publicity. 
This is perhaps because the new provisions are perceived to be an 
interim measure, pending a full-scale review of New Zealand's 
insolvency laws, which all governments in the past five years have 
promised as a priority for legislative reform. 
However, despite the lack of attention, the changes to the liquidation 
provisions are far-reaching, and are likely to have a considerable 
impact on the commercial community. Most other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions have reviewed their insolvency laws during the last 
decade1, including their laws relating to the liquidation of insolvent 
companies. All have considered that the traditional regime based on 
the English model developed late last century and early this century, 
works reasonably well in practice. Separate processes for voluntary, 
involuntary, solvent and insolvent liquidations have been retained in 
those jurisdictions, and the rights of creditors have been maintained, 
and in some instances, enhanced. It is the contention of the writer 
that the rights of creditors have been better protected by the retention 
of the traditional regime than creditors of New Zealand companies will 
be by the reforms introduced in the Companies Act 1993. 
The New Zealand Law Commission, in its review of the liquidation 
regime2, took as its touchstone the desirability of simplifying the 
current multi-tracked process. It therefore reduced the multi-tracked 
procedures to a single procedure, regardless of the solvency of the 
company or the voluntariness of the liquidation. In a further move to 
1 Australia introduced substantial reforms earlier this year; and the United kingdom introduced a new 
Insolvency Act in 1986. 
2 Reported in its Report No. 9 - Company Law Reform and Restatement, June 1989, Wellington. 
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simplify and speed up the liquidation process it removed the need to 
obtain the sanction of the court or committee of inspection before 
undertaking certain steps in the liquidation. 
This paper examines the impact of these reforms on the protection of 
creditors of companies in liquidation. In particular it focuses on the 
impact that the changes to the role of the liquidator have on the 
protection of creditors. The liquidator is the lynch-pin of the liquidation 
process; and the effects of the reforms on the liquidator's ability to 
administer a liquidation will have flow-on effects on the protection 
afforded to creditors. One of the stated aims in the long title to the Act 
is: "To provide straightforward and fair procedures for realising and 
distributing the assets of insolvent companies". This paper will 
consider whether that aim has been achieved from the point of view of 
creditors. 
The paper proceeds on the assumption that the protection of creditors 
is an important aim of any companies legislation, including provisions 
relating to the demise of companies. As pointed out by the learned 
authors of the report of the United Kingdom Review Committee on 
Insolvency Law and Practice (known as the "Cork Report")3 
Credit is the lifeblood of the modern industrialised economy. The 
most significant extenders of credit are banks and other lending 
institutions such as finance houses or building societies. 
Manufacturers extend credit to customers and customers to 
manufacturers; the trade supplier extends credit to his customer; 
creditors are the cornerstone of the trading community. The 
employee who is paid at the end of the working week gives credit to 
his employer. Even the Government itself extends a form of credit by 
obliging employers and others involuntarily to act as tax collectors, for 
example, for PAYE and VAT. 
Credit is fundamental to trade, commerce and industry, whether the 
money is intended to be outstanding for a short term only or for a 
medium or long term and whether secured or unsecured ... 
3 Insolvency Law and Practice Report of the Review Committee, June 1982, London 
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In an address to the New Zealand Law Society conference earlier this 
year4, it was contended that: 
It seems clear enough that, for capitalism to flourish , creditors should 
be cherished. All things being relative, such cherishing must take 
into account the ability of contemporary large creditors to seek their 
lending business in parts of the world that are more rather than less 
protective of their interests. 
The writer respectfully concurs with the view that the protection of 
creditors should be one of the most important aims of any liquidation 
regime. It will be argued in the course of this paper that, as a result of 
the reform process itself, as well as of the substance of the reforms, 
the Companies Act 1993 does not altogether ach ieve such an aim. 
II LIQUIDATION UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1955 
A. Overview 
The winding up provisions of the Companies Act 1955, of wh ich there 
are some 131, together with the 193 rules contained in the Companies 
(Winding Up) Rules5, form a winding up code. By that is meant that 
companies may not be wound up by any method other than that set out 
in the Act and its subordinate legislation6. The provisions, as with 
most of the Act, are based on the English model. 
The method of appointment of liquidators under the Act, and the 
process by which the liquidation is conducted, vary depending on 
whether the winding up is court-ordered or voluntary, and on whether 
in the case of voluntary windings up, the company is solvent or 
4 Creditors and Certainty A paper presented to the New Zealand Law Conference, Wellington , March 1993, 
Jack Hodder. 
5 The Rules contain substantive liquidation law, as well as High Court procedure and the day to day 
procedure of administering a liquidation. 
6 McPherson The Law of Company Liquidation (3.d) The Law Book Company Limited, 1987, at page 3 
7 See Appendix I 
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insolvent. There is no correlation between the solvency of a company 
and the voluntariness of the winding up. A solvent company can be 
forced into liquidation, and its insolvent counterpart can voluntarily 
choose to go into liquidation. In New Zealand, by far the majority of 
liquidations commence by order of the court. The next most common 
type of liquidation is the creditors' voluntary winding up, and there are 
a few members' voluntary windings up every year7. 
B. Court-ordered windings up 
As far as the creditor/liquidator relationship is concerned, the 
significant features of the current regime in relation to court-ordered 
windings up can be summarised as: 
a. Upon making a winding up order, the court must appoint the 
official assignee as provisional liquidator8. The provisional 
liquidator's primary task is to ensure that a permanent liquidator 
is appointed. The provisional liquidator must call separate 
meetings of both creditors and contributories of the company9, 
in order to determine whether the application is to be made to 
the court for the appointment of a liquidator in the place of the 
official assignee. 
In practice, at present official assignees only rarely call such 
meetings. The official assignee is not obliged to call them if he 
or she considers that they need not be called (having regard to 
the assets of the company, the likely result of the winding up of 
the company, and any other relevant factor; and if, upon 
receiving notice from the official assignee of the intention not to 
call a meeting, the creditors or contributories do not require a 
meeting to be held10. If no meeting is held the official assignee 
becomes liquidator of the company. 
6 s. 235(a) Companies Act 1955 
9 For definition of "contributory" see s. 212 
10 s. 235A Companies Act 1955 
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b. The liquidator is subject to extensive supervision by the court. 
First and foremost, the liquidator in a court-ordered winding up 
is an officer of the court11 . There are certain powers which may 
be exercised by the liquidator only with the sanction of the court 
or the committee of inspection12. The liquidator requires 
sanction to: 
1. bring or defend any action or other legal proceedings in 
the name of or on behalf of the company; 
11. carry on the business of the company; 
iii. appoint a solicitor to assist in the conduct of the 
liquidator's duties; 
1v. pay any classes of creditors in full; 
v. make any compromise or arrangement with creditors; 
v1. make any compromise or arrangement with contributories 
or debtors13. 
In addition, there are a number of powers and duties which are 
exercisable by the court, set out in sections 250 to 265 of the 
1955 Act. Some of these may be delegated to the liquidator14, 
and in such cases they are to be exercised by the liquidator as 
an officer of the court, and are subject to the control of the 
court15. 
11 See section 266 Companies Act, and Re Timberland Ltd; Corporate Affairs Commission v HaNey (1979) 4 
A.C.L.R. 259 
12 s. 240 Companies Act 1955 
13 s. 240(1) Companies Act 1955 
14 s. 266 Companies Act 1955 
15 s. 266 Companies Act 1955 
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c. The liquidator is also subject to the scrutiny and control of the 
creditors. The liquidator is bound to "have regard to" directions 
given by resolution of the creditors or the committee of 
inspection16. In addition, the liquidator must summon general 
meetings of creditors if required to do so by resolution of the 
creditors, and can summon such meetings at any time he or she 
desires 17. 
d. The liquidator can be released from the office only by order of 
the court, even if he or she has already resigned or been 
removed form office18. This is a logical result of the liquidator's 
status as the court's officer. Importantly, a release by the court 
from the office of liquidator also releases the liquidator from 
liability for the administration of the liquidation, although there 
are exceptions to this rule if the liquidator fails to disclose 
material information19. This provision clearly has a negative 
impact on the ability of creditors to pursue liquidators in respect 
of their conduct of the liquidation. 
C. Voluntary windings up 
In recent years, under half of all windings up annually have been 
voluntary windings up20. Both types of voluntary winding up (members' 
and creditors') commence by way of a resolution of members to wind 
the company up21 . The ability of the company's directors to make a 
declaration that the company is able to pay its debts as they fall due 
for the period of 12 months from the date of the resolution (known as a 
declaration of solvency), determines which of the two types of winding 
up will take place22. 
16 s. 241 Companies Act 1955 
17 s. 241 (2) Companies Act 1955 
18 s. 246 Companies Act 1955 
19 s. 246(5) Companies Act 1955 
20 See Appendix I 
21 s. 276 Companies Act 1955 
22 s. 27 4 Companies Act 1955 
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D. Members' voluntary windings up 
If the company is solvent, the winding up proceeds under sections 275 
to 282 of the 1955 Act. It is not proposed to discuss this mode of 
winding up in any detail, because by definition creditors will be paid 
out in full, and thus have little need for protection. In connection with 
the interests of creditors, the salient features of a members' voluntary 
winding up can be summarised as: 
a. The liquidator is appointed and his or her remuneration is fixed 
by the company in general meeting23. The liquidator is not, 
therefore, an officer of the Court, although the creditors do have 
the right to apply to Court to have questions determined or to 
ask the Court to exercise any of the powers it is able to exercise 
in court-ordered windings up24. 
b. At the conclusion of the liquidation, there is no provision 
whereby the liquidator can be released from liability. The 
company's creditors therefore retain the right (subject to the 
normal effects of limitation periods under the Statute of 
Limitations) to pursue the liquidator in respect of his or her 
administration of the liquidation. 
c. Creditors do not participate in the winding up process, and 
except in exceptional cases, a court will not be involved in the 
process either. 
E. Creditors' voluntary windings up 
This is the procedure used for a voluntary, insolvent winding up25. 
23 s. 276. Note that under s. 295 the court can appoint a liquidator if no liquidator is acting, and can remove 
a liquidator on being shown cause, and replace the removed liquidator; however, the company retains the 
power to appoint a replacement liquidator upon a vacancy, under s. 277 
24 s. 298 Companies Act 1955 
25 This type of winding up was introduced into English legislation after the report of the Greene Committee 
in 1926, which pointed out the "highly anomalous" position which had existed up until then, where , even if the 
company was insolvent, liquidation took place entirely under the control of members, rather than the 
8 
The provisions of the Companies Act 1955 pertaining to a creditors' 
voluntary winding up are: 
a. A meeting of creditors must be summonsed by the company for 
the day of or the day after, the meeting at which the winding up 
resolution is made by the members. At the creditors' meeting 
the creditors can nominate a liquidator. If the creditors' 
nominee is different from the liquidator appointed by the 
members at their earlier meeting, the creditors' nominee shall 
prevail26 . 
b. The creditors can appoint a committee of inspection of up to 
three persons. If they do so, the company can appoint up to 
three persons to also join the committee27 . 
c. The committee of inspection, or if none, the creditors, are 
responsible for fixing the liquidator's remuneration. 
d. Upon appointment of the liquidator all powers of the directors 
cease, except to the extent sanctioned by the committee of 
inspection or if none, by the creditors. 
e. The liquidator has the same power as in a members' voluntary 
winding up to sell property of the company for consideration 
other than cash, but requires the sanction of the committee of 
inspection or the creditors to do so28. 
f. The winding up is concluded after the liquidator has submitted 
the final account of the winding up to a meeting of the company 
and a meeting of the creditors. A copy of the account and a 
return are filed with the Registrar of Companies, and at the 
creditors. It had been noted that the position was frequently abused by members, who appointed liquidators 
who would collude with those members to suppress evidence of fraud and mismanagement. The underlying 
theory of the new method suggested by the Greene committee was to give control over the insolvent winding 
up to those most directly affected by it - the creditors. 
26 Subject to court order on application of a director, member or creditor - s. 285 Companies Act 1955 
27 s. 286 Companies Act 1955 
28 s 288 Companies Act 1955 
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expiry of three months from the filing of that notice, the company 
is automatically dissolved29 . There is no provision whereby the 
liquidator can apply for a release from liability. 
Ill. THE CURRENT REGIME - PROTECTION OF CREDITORS 
From the above description, it can be seen that protection of creditors 
under the Companies Act 1955 is tailored to each specific type of 
winding up. At one end of the scale is the members' voluntary winding 
up, for which very little creditor protection is provided, given that 
creditors in such winding up are at little risk. At the other end of the 
scale is the court-ordered winding up, which regime contains extensive 
creditor protection. The measures for protection of creditors in 
creditors' voluntary windings up lies between the other two types of 
winding up. 
The most significant creditor protection measure in the 1955 Act court-
ordered winding up regime is the extensive supervisory role of the 
Court. Section 240 ensures that actions of a liquidator which may put 
the creditors at risk are overseen by an independent party. It may be 
argued that a court is not the best-qualified forum for such oversight, 
and that some judges may lack the necessary skills to exercise 
meaningful supervision in the liquidation context, but the effect of the 
provision is to provide some sort of check and balance on the actions 
of the liquidator. As will be discussed below, the 1993 Act dispenses 
in all cases with the need of a liquidator to obtain sanction of the court 
prior to undertaking any act, unless he or she chooses to apply for 
directions. 
As an extension of the court's supervisory role in court-ordered 
liquidations, is the liquidator's role in such liquidations as an officer of 
the court. 
By virtue of section 240 the committee of inspection is also a powerful 
creditor protection mechanism. It can act as a substitute for the court, 
29 s. 291 Companies Act 1955 
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in granting sanction of the specified activities of the liquidator. As the 
committee is at least 50% comprised of creditors it is obviously a very 
effective means of ensuring that creditors' interests are monitored and 
protected. Under the 1993 Act, the name of the committee is, 
significantly, changed to "liquidation committee", reflecting its much 
reduced role and powers in the liquidation process. 
A further protection of creditors is the obligation on liquidators to 
provide creditors with information, both as to the financial state of the 
company upon liquidation, and of the conduct of the liquidation. The 
liquidator is obliged to call meetings of creditors, and to supply 
creditors with a report as to the affairs of the company. As will be 
discussed below, in light of the reduction of other forms of creditor 
protection, the 1993 Act purports to place greater obligations on the 
liquidator to provide such information to creditors, with the introduction 
of such requirements as the six-month report to creditors. However, as 
will be discussed later in this paper, the exceptions to these rules are 
so extensive as to seriously undermine their usefulness as a protection 
to creditors. 
The 1955 Act also allows a more direct role in the liquidation to be 
taken by creditors by way of the meeting of creditors. The meeting has 
the power to elect a liquidator to replace the person appointed by the 
court (in the case of court-ordered windings up), or by the members (in 
the case of creditors' voluntary windings up). This abil ity to have a say 
in who acts as liquidator was initially absent from the Bi ll, as will be 
discussed below, but was reinserted into the new Act. The liquidator 
must have regard to the views of the creditors, as expressed by them 
in meetings. It may be thought that with the removal of the supervisory 
role of the Court, and the reduction in the power of the committee of 
inspection, the role of the creditors may have been increased under 
the new legislation accordingly. However, as will be discussed below, 
that is not the case. 
Finally, any control on who may act as a liquidator is designed to be a 
protection for creditors. The 1955 Act, in fact contains very few 
restrictions on who may be a liquidator, and although the Law 
Commission in its report advocated that only "qualified persons" as 
11 
defined by the Commission, should be permitted to act as liquidator, 
this protection was not carried through into the Act, as will be 
discussed below. 
IV PROCESS OF LIQUIDATION 
A. Reduction to a Single Process 
The single most important change in the liquidation provisions of the 
Bill is the reduction down to one process of the several different types 
of processes which currently exist under the 1955 Act. Apart from 
some procedural differences immediately upon the commencement of 
liquidation, creditors now face essentially the same procedures 
whether a company is solvent or insolvent, and whether its liquidation 
is forced upon it by court order or entered into willingly. This reform 
renders the New Zealand regime unique among Commonwealth 
jurisdictions; but strangely, given the potential impact of the reform on 
the interests of creditors, it has not received a great deal of attention 
by way of submissions to the select committee or in the media30, and 
the merits of the single system of liquidation do not appear to have 
been widely canvassed. 
The Law Commission, in instigating the reform, based the proposal on 
its policy of simplifying company law. In its Report No 9 the 
Commission stated: 
At present there are five ways in which a company may be 
ended. The methods have different modes of 
commencement, different procedures and different 
consequences. We do not see any purpose or justification for 
this complexity. We believe that the disbanding of companies 
should be possible with minimum formality . .. Liquidation can 
be applied to companies whether solvent or insolvent, and 
30 With the exception of the Society of Accountants, which made a number of submissions on the issues 
raised by the reforms at several stages of the reform process. 
31 Above, n.2 para 640 
32 Above, n.2 
33 Above, n.2 para 642 
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whether commenced by voluntary actions of the company or 
imposed by others31 . 
C. The Bill 
The first draft of the Bill , based on the draft proposed by the Law 
Commission in its Report32, carried through in a pure form a single 
system of liquidation. As with the Law Commission draft Bill , once 
liquidation had commenced, absolutely no recognition was given to the 
differing circumstances which might have brought about the liquidation 
of the company. The draft sought to simplify procedures , and thus 
many procedural safeguards for creditors which are built into the 1955 
Act had been discarded. These safeguards were replaced, the Law 
Commission draft, with the single, fundamental protection of allowing 
only experienced insolvency practitioners to act as liquidators33. With 
the guarantee of an expert and objective liquidator, the Law 
Commission believed that there was no longer a need for complex, 
expensive and lengthy procedural safeguards, such as the need to 
obtain sanction of the court to undertake various activities (in the case 
of court-ordered windings up), and the need to permit creditors to 
appoint their nominated liquidator (in the case of creditors' voluntary 
windings up). 
The Bill did not, however, carry through the concept of the experienced 
insolvency practitioner, perhaps because of the prevailing 
governmental policy against occupational licensing, and the protection 
which it provided. Reaction to the pure single process introduced in 
the first draft of the Bill was sharp34. As a result, certain measures, 
giving creditors greater involvement in the liquidation process, 
depending on the state of solvency of the company were 
reintroduced35_ 
34 In submissions to the Select Committee 
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D. Comparison With Other Jurisdictions 
As stated above, the single system which the Bill contains is unique in 
Commonwealth and, as far as the writer can ascertain, in United 
States jurisdictions. 
1. United Kingdom 
A distinction is drawn between solvent and insolvent companies in the 
United Kingdom. Insolvent companies are wound up under the 
Insolvency Act 1986. Although legislating for both personal and 
company insolvencies, the UK Insolvency Act (unlike the Canadian 
and United States Bankruptcy Act) does not assimilate the law relating 
to individuals and companies into one regime. Rather, the Act sets out 
two quite separate regimes - Part I of the Act dealing with companies, 
and Part II dealing with individuals. The Act was introduced in 1986 
after an intensive law reform exercise based around the Cork Report36. 
As with the New Zealand 1955 Act, the Act provides that winding up 
can commence either by order of the court, or voluntarily37. In 
addition, it retains a distinction in the case of voluntary winding up 
between creditors' and members' windings up38, with the factor 
determining which type will take place being the ability of the directors 
to make a declaration of solvency. The Act deals with solvent 
windings up, in the same way as under the New Zealand Act, despite 
the title of the Act 39. In a court-ordered winding up the official trustee 
is appointed by the court in every case40, and the creditors and 
contributories later have the right at their respective meetings to 
resolve to appoint another liquidator. The court appoints a liquidator 
35 cl. 220A - cl 220C of the Bill , which will be discussed in more depth below 
36 Above, n.3 
37 s. 73 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) 
38 s.90 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) 
39 The long title to the Act states that the Act is "to consolidate the enactments relating to company 
insolvency and winding up (including the winding up of companies that are not insolvent, and of unregistered 
companies) ... " 
40 s.136 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) 
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only in the case of a dispute between the contributories and the 
creditors over who should be appointed as liquidator. In all material 
respects the regime is the same as that presently in force in New 
Zealand. The only minor differences are: 
a. There is provision for the release of liquidators in the case of 
voluntary windings up41 ; 
b. In the case of creditors' voluntary windings up, until such time 
as the creditors can meet to determine whether to appoint their 
own liquidator, the liquidator appointed by the company must 
apply to court before carrying any actions in relation to the 
liquidation apart from the following duties: 
(i) to take into custody or control property to which the 
company is or appears to be entitled; 
(ii) to dispose of perishable goods and other goods if their 
value is likely to diminish if not immediately dealt with ; 
and 
(iii) to do all things appropriate to protect the company's 
assets.42 
c. If a company has a paid up capital of not more than 120,000 
pounds, the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the 
High Court to wind up the company. 
2. Canada 
In some jurisdictions in Canada, companies which are solvent, or have 
obtained the consent of their creditors can terminate their existence by 
surrendering their charter or certificate of incorporation . 
41 s. 173 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) 
42 s. 166 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) 
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Under federal or provincial legislation, a company may be wound up 
under various grounds, but not on the grounds of insolvency. 
Insolvent companies must be wound up under either the provisions of 
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or the Winding Up Act, both of 
which are federal Acts. 
Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the title of which was 
amended in 1992 by the addition of the word "insolvency" as a 
consequence of certain amendments wh ich apply to debtors who are 
insolvent, but not necessarily bankrupt) , the court can make a 
"receiving order" 43, appointing a trustee, in whom all property of the 
company vests. The company continues in existence, and the powers 
of the directors and officers of the company are not affected by the 
bankruptcy, although in practical terms will obviously be restricted by 
virtue of the fact that the company's property is vested in the trustee. 
The trustee must summon a meeting of creditors, and the meeting may 
appoint a number of inspectors (up to five)44. The trustee must have 
regard to the directions of the creditors and the inspectors in the 
administration of the estate. The trustee's duties are to get in all of the 
assets of the company, collect claims against debtors, enforce the 
liability of unpaid shares45, and distribute dividends to creditors. 
Only if it has satisfied the claims of its creditors in full can a company 
be discharged from bankruptcy46. In such a situation, the company will 
normally have obtained a discharge and then proceed to wind up 
voluntarily. 
Alternatively, companies can be wound up under the W inding Up Act. 
This legislation provides for the liquidation of the company, as 
opposed to its bankruptcy. The Act applies to solvent and insolvent 
companies. In the case of insolvent winding up, the court makes an 
order upon petition. Upon winding up, a provisional liquidator is 
43 s. 43 Bankruptcy Act (Canada) 
44 s. 116 Bankruptcy Act (Canada) 
45 s.16 - s.28 Bankruptcy Act (Canada) 
46 s. 169(4) Bankruptcy Act (Canada) 
47 Part 5.4 
48 Part 5.4A 
49 s. 95A 
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appointed, and the matter is referred to an officer of the court to 
appoint a permanent liquidator, although the court can appoint a 
liquidator at the hearing of the petition. In all other material respects 
the provisions are very similar to the 1955 Act, although the court 
retains closer control over the conduct of the liquidation. For example, 
the liquidator must bring to court a list of disputed claims, and will 
serve notice on creditors to appear and prove the claim before the 
court. 
3. Australia 
The Australian Corporations Law provides for two modes of winding up 
- court ordered or voluntary. Major reforms to the provisions relating to 
winding up by the court, introduced by way of the Corporate Law 
Reform Act 1992 came into force on 23 June, 1993. These were 
brought about as a result of the recommendations of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission's report entitled "General Insolvency 
Enquiry" - known as the Harmer Report. The provisions relating to 
court-ordered winding up are now divided into two parts - one dealing 
with what is now termed "winding up in insolvency"47, and the other 
termed "winding up by the court on other grounds"48. In addition, the 
distinction in voluntary windings up between members' voluntary 
windings up and creditors' voluntary windings up is maintained. 
Overall the provisions, although more detailed and extensive than the 
New Zealand Act (consisting of approximately 250 provisions), are in 
most respects similar to those set out in the New Zealand Act. The 
major differences can be summarised as: 
a. The new division relating to insolvent court-ordered windings up 
includes an extensive definition of insolvency49, and introduces 
rebuttable presumptions of insolvency to replace the previous 
deeming provisions50. Once the company is wound up, though, 
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it is subject to the same creditor and court involvement whether 
it is solvent or insolvent. 
b. Overall court and creditor involvement in the conduct of the 
liquidation is lower than that under the current New Zealand 
legislation. A liquidator requires sanction only for: 
a compromise of a debt in excess of $20,000; and 
the execution by a liquidator of a long-term agreement on 
behalf of the company51 (long-term being in excess of 
three months). 
c. In the case of voluntary windings up, the liquidator requires 
sanction before exercising the same powers as those requiring 
sanction in a court-ordered winding up. In the case of a 
creditors' voluntary winding up the sanction may be from the 
court, committee of inspection, or resolution of creditors; in the 
case of a members' voluntary winding up, it must be from a 
resolution of members. , 
d. Methods of appointing liquidators vary from State to State, but 
the question of who may act as a liquidator is very tightly 
regulated. All liquidators must be registered by the local State 
office conducting the regulation of companies. Criteria include 
appropriate educational qualifications, evidence of good fame 
and character, extensive experience in insolvency practice, and 
non-disqualification from being registered. In addition, a person 
may be appointed or registered as an official liquidator (and 
thus eligible to be appointed as a liquidator in a court-ordered 
liquidation). Such appointment is an entirely discretionary 
process. 
e. In a creditors' voluntary winding up, a liquidator appointed by 
the members must obtain approval of the court in order to take 
50 s. 459C - c.f. s. 218 of the NZ Companies Act 1955 
51 5 . 477 
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certain acts prior to the creditors having an opportunity to 
appoint their own liquidator. 
4. United States 
Companies can be wound up either via the federal bankruptcy laws52. 
or by way of non-bankruptcy liquidation. In addition, there is the ability 
to reorganise, which is beyond the scope of this paper, and will not be 
further discussed. 
Non-bankruptcy liquidations (solvent liquidations) under all statutes 
involve, as with the Westminster model, the collecting in of the assets 
of the company, the payment of expenses and debts, and distribution 
of the net assets to the shareholders of the company, according to the 
priorities set out in the particular state statute53. 
Liquidation under such statutes can be commenced either by the court, 
or by the company. Where the liquidation is "non-judicial", the court's 
supervision can be invoked. 
Insolvent corporations are liquidated under the federal bankruptcy 
laws54. Although some states have statutes dealing with the 
liquidation of insolvent corporations55, when the provisions of such 
statutes conflict with the federal statute, the federal legislation prevails. 
Bankruptcy of a company along the lines of a liquidation under the 
New Zealand companies legislation is dealt with in Chapter 7 of the 
Code, and is known as 'straight bankruptcy' . Bankruptcy can be 
involuntary at the suit of creditors, or other parties, or voluntary, at the 
suit of the company itself. A "trustee" is appointed - either a state-
appointed trustee, known as the US trustee, or another trustee 
52 Bankruptcy Code Title 11 United States Code 
53 See Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations (3.d) 1983 St Paul, Minn . West Publishing Co., where 
various examples of such statutes are cited . 
54 Above, n. 52 
55 For example, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, para 1202 ff. 
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appointed by a meeting of creditors56. The trustee's duty is to "collect 
and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee 
serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with 
the best interests of the parties in interest"57. A creditor's committee of 
between three and eleven members can consult with the trustee, make 
recommendations regarding the trustee's conduct of the bankruptcy, 
and submit any questions regarding the bankruptcy to the court or to 
the US trustee58. Corporations cannot be discharged from 
bankruptcy59. 
5. Discussion 
(a) General 
It can be seen, then, that the single liquidation process 
introduced by the 1993 Act is unique. All of the other 
jurisdictions considered differentiate at least between solvent 
and insolvent liquidations. As proposed in the Harmer report, 
the Australian Corporation Law has gone so far as to make this 
explicit in its terminology, by introducing a new Division entitled 
"Winding Up in Insolvency" . The authors of the report state60 
The existing terminology of "winding up" applies to the 
process of administering the affairs of both solvent and 
insolvent companies. It can be confusing and misleading, It 
creates a perception that any company which is being wound 
up is insolvent. This may cause misunderstanding and prove 
embarrassing to those who are associated with solvent 
companies undergoing a winding up process. 
(b) Solvent windings up 
56 Paragraphs 701-703 Bankruptcy Code 
57 Paragraph 704 Bankruptcy Code 
58 Paragraph 705 Bankruptcy Code 
59 Paragraph 727 Bankruptcy Code 
60 The Harmer Report, para 21 
61 See above, n.6 at page 28 
62 As is the case under the current Act 
63 Under s. 258 Companies Act 1993 
64 s. 255 Companies Act 1993 
65 Under s. 255(4) 
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In the case of a solvent winding up, all creditors, by 
definition, will be paid in full. They therefore have no 
financial interest in the winding up of the company 61 . It 
could be argued that indeed any involvement by the 
creditors in the process will have an adverse effect on 
the speed and expense involved in winding the company 
up. The provisions of the 1993 Act however, permit quite 
extensive creditor involvement in solvent windings up. 
Although under section 243(8) a liquidator of a solvent 
company which has been put into liquidation by the 
company or the board (i .e. essentially voluntarily) is not 
bound to call a meeting of creditors to consider the 
appointment of their own liquidator, a liquidator may 
cause such a meeting to be called in the case of a court-
ordered solvent winding up62. In addition there is no 
restriction in the case of solvent liquidations on the rights 
of creditors to call meetings of creditors63, or to appoint 
liquidation committees. In addition, the liquidator is 
subject to the duties of settling a list of creditors; 
preparing and forwarding to creditors a statement of 
affairs and initial report; and preparing and forwarding 
six-monthly reports to creditors64. All of these duties are 
time-consuming and may involve considerable expense. 
Ironically, the less solvent a company is, the less likely a 
liquidator is to be subject to these duties. If the liquidator 
is satisfied that the value of the assets available for 
distribution to creditors is not likely to exceed 20 cents in 
every dollar, the liquidator is not required to carry out the 
duties laid down in section 255(5)65. This exemption will 
not, of course, apply to a solvent company, and if a 
liquidator wishes to avoid the duties an application to the 
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court under section 255( 4) is necessary. It appears, 
therefore, that the liquidator is bound to incur time and 
expense either in carrying out the duties or in making an 
application to avoid doing so. It seems difficult to justify 
the cost of what are creditor protection measures in 
circumstances where creditors do not, by definition, 
require such protection. 
(c) Insolvent windings up 
66 By submission dated 1 March , 1993 
67 Dated 25 February, 1993 
68 DP 32, page 11 
69 Above, n.3 at page 154 
The tenor of the submissions of both the Society of 
Accountants66 and KPMG Peat Marwick67 to the Minister 
of Justice clearly indicated that, in the view of those 
organisations, what are presently known as creditors' 
voluntary windings up work well in practice. In its 1987 
discussion paper the Australian Law Reform 
Commission68, suggested that the distinction between a 
court-ordered or compulsory winding up and a creditors' 
voluntary winding up be extinguished. However, by the 
time the Commission produced the Harmer Report in 
1988, it was clear that it had discarded this notion. It 
identified only two aspects of the creditors' winding up 
process which it considered unsatisfactory: the absence 
of some ordered administration between the time of 
calling the meetings of creditors and contributories and 
the appointment of a liquidator ; and the lack of 
independent information about the financial affairs and 
conduct of the business of the company at the meeting of 
creditors. The authors of the Cork report69 
The voluntary procedures for winding up insolvent companies 
appear to have worked reasonably well for many years and, 
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save in one respect we do not believe that any major changes 
are necessary in their practical application. 
Although the Cork report advocated the abolition of the 
title "creditors' voluntary winding up", on the grounds that 
"though explicable on historical grounds, is somewhat 
misleading; it has been represented to us that confusion 
sometimes arises over the precise difference between a 
members' and a creditors voluntary winding up", the 
terms were carried forward into the United Kingdom 
Insolvency Act 1986. 
It can be seen therefore, that despite debate and 
initiatives to abolish the creditors' voluntary winding up 
process, it has survived intact, indeed in enhanced form, 
in other jurisdictions. The creditors' voluntary winding up 
is an attractive alternative to a court-ordered winding up 
because of its relatively streamlined administration 
compared to a court-ordered insolvent winding up. The 
creditors avoid the time and expense of applying to court 
for a winding up order, but derive protection from their 
involvement in the liquidation process and their ability to 
apply to the court if the need arises. The liquidator has 
greater autonomy than a liquidator in a court-ordered 
winding up, and can thus get on with the duties of getting 
in the assets of the company and realising them. THe 
problem identified in the Harmer and Cork reports of the 
need to restrict the activities of the company or liquidator 
appointed by the members prior to the creditors' meeting 
does not seem to have arisen in New Zealand or to have 
been discussed by New Zealand commentators. It is the 
writer's view that most of the advantages of the creditors' 
voluntary winding up have been preserved in the 1993 
Act. There are a few caveats to that assessment 
however. 
The provisions of the Bill , as first drafted, had a negative 
impact on the protection of creditors in an insolvent, 
70 s. 284 Companies Act 1955 
71 s. 258(1 )(b) Companies Act 1993 
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voluntary winding up. There was no ability for creditors 
to appoint their own liquidator or for a meeting of 
creditors to be called early on in the liquidation. This 
defect was partially rectified by the insertion of clauses 
220A to 220C of the version of the Bill reported back 
from the Select Committee (now sections 243-245 of the 
1993 Act) . Under the reported-back version of the Bill 
there were, however, several difficulties with the 
operation of these provisions, one of which was the 
inordinately long time-limits which the clauses set down 
for the calling of a meeting of creditors, or of advising 
creditors that the liquidator proposes to call no such 
meeting. Under current law70, unless the company's 
directors make a declaration of solvency within 30 days 
before the winding up resolution , the company must call 
a meeting of creditors for the same day as, or the day 
after the day the winding up resolution is passed. Under 
the 1993 Act, a liquidator must call a meeting of creditors 
to determine whether to pass a resolution specifying a 
time or times that creditors' meetings should be called71 . 
As originally drafted under the reported-back version of 
the Bill , notice of the calling of the meeting of creditors 
had to be given in all cases within 40 days of the 
commencement of the liquidation, at the latest, since the 
notice had to accompany the liquidator's initial report 
required under section 255 (2) There was a gap in the 
Bill , in that it does not provide for when such notice shall 
be given in the case where a liquidator is exempted from 
the requirement to provide an initial report under section 
255. These problems have been rectified under the 
1993 Act. However, as will be discussed below, even as 
amended, these time limits may well have an adverse 
effect on the protection of creditors due to the actions of 
the liquidator first appointed by the members. In 
LAW UBRARV 
VICTORIA Ui'Jl\/E~SITY OF 'JELLlfJGTON. 
72 s. 255 
73 s. 258 
74 S. 286 
75 cl. 255(4) 
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addition, the whole liquidation process is slowed 
unnecessarily. 
In addition the new Act reduces cred itor protection 
through the removal of the need for creditor sanction for 
certain actions. In this respect the Act goes further even 
than the Australian legislation by removing completely 
the need to obtain sanction for any act. This departure 
will certainly have an adverse effect on the protection of 
creditors, at least in those liquidations where a dividend 
of less than 20 cents in the dollar is expected. The 
removal of the need of the liquidator to obtain sanction 
may be balanced by the provisions of the Act72 
increasing the amount of information a liquidator is 
bound to provide to creditors. Armed with such 
information the creditors can arrange for a meeting of 
creditors to be called, through which to express their 
views73 , or alternatively, can apply to court to have the 
liquidator's decision or action considered there74. 
However, a liquidator is not subject to the information 
duties where it is anticipated that the dividend to the 
unsecured creditors will not exceed 20 cents in the 
dollar75. This exception seriously erodes the justification 
for removing the requirement to obtain sanction. In such 
very insolvent liquidations it will be a considerable 
advantage to creditors to appoint a committee of 
inspection to supervise the liquidator, and to act as a 
conduit of information to the other creditors. 
(d) Court-ordered windings up 
In the case of involuntary, insolvent liquidations (by far 
the majority of liquidations in New Zealand )76, again the 
76 See Appendix I 
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Act's reforms go a great deal further than those in other 
jurisdictions, as far as a reduction of court and creditor 
supervision of the liquidator is concerned. This aspect of 
the reforms will be discussed in more detail below, in the 
context of a practical example. In addition, the same 
initial difficulties arise as in a voluntary insolvent 
liquidation, as to the extent to which a liquidator first 
appointed by the court may act. However, it is this type 
of liquidation which is least affected by the provisions of 
the Act, and many of the provisions of the liquidation 
section seem to fit most comfortably into the insolvent, 
non-voluntary context. Of all types of liquidation, 
creditors' interests appear to suffer least from the 
reforms in this type of liquidation. 
V. THE LIQUIDATOR 
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, the liquidator is the 
lynch-pin of the liquidation process77. 
A. The Liquidator's Principal Duty 
Section 253 of the Act sets out the liquidator's principal duty. 
Essentially, this provision is the cornerstone of Part XVI. The other 
77 The title "liquidator'' dates from the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856, although under that legislation 
the position of liquidator was more analogous to an assignee in bankruptcy than to a modern liquidator. The 
corporate personality of the company ceased upon the appointment of the liquidator, when all property of the 
company became vested in the liquidator. Under modern company winding up law, the notion of corporate 
personality is carried through into the winding up period, and upon appointment, the liquidator assumes the 
office and powers of the directors of the company. The liquidator's position consists of a range of functions 
and relationships. First and foremost, the liquidator is a creature of statute, and is subject to the provisions of 
the relevant Act. In some cases (in court-ordered liquidations, and always, in the case of official liquidators) 
he or she is an officer of the court. In relation to the company's creditors, it has been stated that: "it is 
impossible to be definite about the precise nature of the legal relationship which exists between a liquidator 
and the creditors . . . of a company in liquidation" , but the position has been described as being similar to 
that of a trustee or quasi-trustee, but without all of the powers and duties of a trustee. The liquidator certainly 
owes a fiduciary duty to the company, and almost certainly to the creditors and shareholders of the company. 
The liquidator's powers and duties range from purely administrative through to quasi-judicial, often calling for 
acute commercial judgement in difficult circumstances. To add to the challenge of the position, although the 
liquidator takes on the powers and office of directors, liability for his or her actions is not limited, and in 
various circumstances the liquidator is exposed to personal liability; and all this in a situation where he or she 
is under a duty not to profit. 
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powers and duties conferred upon the liquidator in Part XVI are, on the 
whole, designed to give effect to this provision. The clause is 
modelled on cl. 207 of the Law Commission's draft Bi 11 78. In its 
commentary, the Law Commission stated that : " This statement of the 
common law is intended for clarity and completeness" 79. 
The section provides: 
Subject to section 254 of this Act, the principal duty of a liquidator of a 
company is-
(a) To take possession of, protect, realise, and distribute the assets, 
or the proceeds of the realisation of the assets, of the company to its 
creditors in accordance with this Act; and 
(b) If there are surplus assets remaining , to distribute them, or the 
proceeds of the realisation of the surplus assets, in accordance with 
section 313(4) of this Act-
in a reasonable and efficient manner. 
Given the importance of section 253 in the scheme of the liquidation 
regime, it is suggested that its drafting is somewhat imprecise. 
For example, the provision has been amended since the first draft of 
the Bill in an apparent attempt to clarify the fact that a liquidator can 
make distributions either in specie or of the proceeds of realisation of 
the sale of the assets. The words "or of the proceeds of the realisation 
of the assets" have been inserted, and presumably relate to the duty to 
distribute. However, the duty to realise has been left untouched, and 
there is thus an apparent contradiction between the duty to realise and 
the ability to distribute assets without realisation. In addition, it is 
unclear whether the phrase "in accordance with this Act" relates to the 
distribution to creditors, or to all duties set out in this section. While 
these are apparently insignificant technical defects, it is submitted that 
they could produce some uncertainty, which would clearly be adverse 
to the interests of creditors. 
B Property Subject to a Charge 
78 Above, n.2 at page 300 
79 Above, n.2, at paragraph 667 
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The duties outlined in section 253 are expressed to be subject to 
section 254. This provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Part of this Act-
(a) Except where the charge is surrendered or taken to be 
redeemed under section 305 of this Act, a liquidator may, 
but is not required to, carry out any duty or exercise any 
power in relation to property that is subject to a charge: 
(b) Where-
(i) A company is put into liquidation under section 
241 (2)(c) of this Act; and 
(ii) The Official Assignee is the liquidator of the 
company; and 
(iii) The company has no assets available for 
distribution to creditors of the company, -
the Official Assignee shall not be required, without the consent of 
the Minister of Justice , to carry out any duty or exercise any power 
in connection with the liquidation if, to do so, would or would be 
likely to involve incurring any expense. 
The exempting of the liquidator from exercising the duties in section 
253 in relation to property subject to a charge, unless it is surrendered, 
is a reversal of the current position. The issue of whether a liquidator 
is bound to exercise any duties in relation to property subject to a 
charge was raised in Re Your Size Fashions Limitecf8°. In that case, 
the official assignee became the official liquidator of Your Size 
Fashions Limited (in liquidation). The secured creditor (Westpac) 
refused to realise the assets secured by its debenture on the grounds 
that the cost of so doing would have exceeded the amount 
recoverable. Instead it demanded that the Official Assignee realise 
the charged assets on its behalf. It was economic for the Official 
Assignee to undertake the realisation because of the low rate of 
remuneration which the Official Assignee is permitted to charge under 
the relevant provision of the Companies Act 1955. Pending resolution 
ao (1990) 5 NZCLC 66,804 
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of the matter by the Court, the Official Assignee refused to realise the 
secured assets, on the ground that there was no realistic possibility of 
any funds being available for unsecured creditors. He indicated to the 
secured creditor that only if appointed as the secured creditor's agent 
(with remuneration at the full market rates of a receiver}, and if given 
an indemnity as to costs, would the he take any steps on the secured 
creditor's behalf. This was the normal procedural practice, where the 
unsecured creditors would not gain anything from the realisation. 
Williamson J held that the liquidator could not so refuse. He held that 
a liquidator's duties extend to all creditors, and not just to those 
proving in a liquidation, and relied in support of this proposition on 
Gooch's Case; re Contract Corporation81 . He also relied upon the 
wording of R58 of the Companies (Winding Up) Rules82. Finally, he 
relied on the proposition that property subject to a charge remains the 
property of the company, and the fact that "a secured creditor is 
entitled to stand aloof from the liquidation"83. 
In the first draft of the Bill, it appeared that the rationale of the 
predecessor to section 254(1) was to redress the situation which arose 
specifically in the case of an official liquidator, whose fees are 
statutorily set at a considerably lower rate than private insolvency 
practitioners would charge for the same service: in other words, where 
the secured creditor insists on a State-subsidised service. However, 
the subclause as originally drafted went much further than simply 
redressing this problem. It appeared to go so far as tying the 
liquidator's hands by preventing him or her from acting in relation to 
81 (1872) 7 Ch App 207 
82 This Rule provides: 
(1) The duties imposed on the Court by subsection (1) of section 251 of the Act in a winding up by the Court 
with regard to the collection of the assets of the company and the application of the assets in discharge of 
the company's liabilities shall be discharged by the liquidator as an officer of the Court subject to the control 
of the Court. 
(2) For the purpose of the discharge by the liquidator of the duties imposed by subsection (1) of section 251 
of the Act, and subclause (1) of this rule , the liquidator in a winding up by the Court shall, for the purpose of 
acquiring or retaining possession of the property of the company, be in the same position as if he were a 
receiver of the property appointed by the Court, and the Court may, on his application, enforce the acquisition 
or retention accordingly. 
83 Note that section of the Act circumscribes this ability of the creditor to stand aloof from the liquidation, as 
will be discussed below in the context of a practical example. 
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property subject to a charge. There are occasions where the creditors 
as a whole would benefit from the liquidator having such ability, for 
example where the company has a substantial equity of redemption in 
the asset, or in the case of property subject to a floating charge, which 
ranks behind preferential claims, and which a liquidator may wish to 
realise to satisfy the preferential claims84. 
In the Act, these criticisms have been addressed, by the provision in 
section 254(a) that the liquidator "may but is not required to" carry out 
the duties. In addition, a new provision, section 254(b), has been 
inserted into the Act. This addresses the position of the Official 
Assignee specifically. It provides that, where the company has no 
assets available for distribution to creditors, the Official Assignee is not 
required, without the consent of the Minister of Justice, to take any 
step in the liquidation, if to do so would be likely to incur an expense. 
This provision is essentially a re-enactment of Rule 175 of the 
Companies (Winding Up) Rules. 
The new provision raises the issue of what is meant by a "creditor". 
Presumably the intention is that the section applies to non-secured 
creditors only (including preferential and unsecured creditors) ; on the 
basis that assets which are charged are not assets of the company 
"available for distribution". However, this contention was expressly 
rejected by Williamson J in the Case of Your Size Fashions85. The 
Official Assignee argued in that case that the assets of the company 
covered by Westpac's debenture were not "available assets". 
Westpac argued, on the other hand, that the debenture did not pass 
legal title, or possession, of the charged assets, and that they 
therefore were available assets. Williamson J., agreeing with 
Westpac, adopted the reasoning of Denning MR in the case of Re 
Barleycorn Enterprises Limitecf86 , and held that the same reasoning 
applies to the Companies Act 1955. 
84 Such criticisms of the clause were raised in submissions to the Minister of Justice by the New Zealand 
Society of Accountants (1 March , 1993), and by Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young (25 May 1993) 
85 Above, note 80 
86 [1970] Ch. 465 (CA) 
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C Duty of Liquidator to Prepare Statement of Affairs 
Under the Companies Act 1955, the directors of a company wound up 
by order of the Court are obliged to prepare a statement of the affairs 
of the company 87. The statement must be verified by at least one 
director, and the secretary, or persons selected by the official 
assignee. Failure to furnish the statement is punishable by a fine for 
each day of default ($20), and in addition, the Court retains the 
jurisdiction to require the statement to be submitted88. There is no 
provision under current law which requires a statement of affairs to be 
prepared in the case of voluntary windings up. 
The Law Commission, in its draft Bill , shifted the responsibility for the 
preparation of statements of affairs on to the liquidator89. The 
Commission indicated that it envisaged use of a simpler form than that 
currently prescribed90. It stated that the policy for the shift in 
responsibility was that: 
It is preferable that the liquidator compile reliable , if sometimes 
incomplete, information, and give that to the creditors and 
shareholders rather than expend resources on obtaining a statement 
of affairs from difficult directors91 . 
This proposal has been carried through to the Act in section 
255(2)( c)(ii)(A). 
In the writer's view, it is questionable whether the Law Commission's 
rationale holds true in all cases. In the case of insolvent voluntary 
windings up, the requirement for a statement of affairs will no doubt 
enhance the protection of the company's creditors by adding to the 
87 Sees. 231 Companies Act 1955, and Rules 33 - 38 of the Companies (Winding Up) Rules 
88 See Re New Par Consuls (1898] 1 QB 573 
89 Above, n.2 cl.208 of the draft Bill 
90 Form 21 Companies (Winding Up) Rules 
91 Above, n.2 para 669 
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information available to them. In addition it gives the creditors the 
opportunity to inform the liquidator if they detect from the statement 
that she is proceeding on information which they know to be 
incomplete or inaccurate. 
On the other hand, in the case of solvent windings up, it is 
questionable whether a statement of affairs is necessary at all. It is 
submitted that, given that the creditors will be paid in full , the affairs of 
the company are really of no interest to them. 
The problem of reluctant directors is one which it is suggested is 
unlikely to be encountered in a voluntary winding up situation, as 
opposed to a court-ordered winding up where the liquidation order was 
made against the will of the directors. It is likely that the liquidator, 
being less familiar with the affairs of the company than the directors , 
will incur a greater cost both in time and in money in preparing the 
statement of affairs. It seems difficult to justify this in the case of 
liquidations which commenced voluntarily92, where the policy reasons 
for shifting the responsibility do not appear to apply. 
Even in the case of court-ordered liquidations (specifically insolvent, 
involuntary liquidations which is the type of situation which most 
readily lends itself to the Law Commission's analysis, in the writer's 
view, the policy for the change is questionable. In compiling the 
statement of affairs the liquidator is likely to require the assistance of 
one or more of the directors of the company to provide her with the 
requisite information. If a director is reluctant to prepare the statement 
it is most likely that he or she will be equally reluctant to assist the 
liquidator in preparing the statement of affairs. The creditors do not 
have the comfort of an effective sanction against directors for non-co-
operation under the 1993 Act. Although bound to assist the liquidator, 
there does not appear to be a sanction for directors and other 
company officers who fail to do so93 . The Law Commission may have 
recognised this in its reference to "incomplete information". Again, it is 
92 i.e. where a liquidator is appointed by special resolution of the shareholders under section 241 (2)(a) , or 
by the board under section 241 (2)(b) 
93 s. 261 Companies Act 1993 
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likely that, due to lack of familiarity with the affairs of the company, the 
liquidator will often incur a greater cost in preparing the statement of 
affairs than a director would do, and this of course reduces the funds 
in the estate available to creditors. 
Although the issue of who prepares the statement does not at first 
glance appear to affect the question of where the cost of its 
preparation will lie, since in either case the liquidation will bear those 
costs, this may not always necessarily be so. In the unreported 
decision of Re Hayes Garage Limited (In Liq.)94 , the Court allowed a 
liquidator to deduct from the costs presented to him by a director for 
the preparation of the statement, the cost of work which should have 
been undertaken by the company before it was placed into liquidation. 
Such a sanction will not be available under the new provision, and if, 
as is often the case, the papers of the company are not up to date, the 
liquidation initially will have to bear the cost of the liquidator doing this 
or causing it to be done. This cost, will of course ultimately be borne 
by creditors. Creditors may gain some redress against the directors 
for failure to keep adequate accounts, if such failure has contributed to 
the company's insolvency95, or via other directors' duties. 
Another relevant factor, although of less importance, is the ability to 
detect errors or omissions in the statement of affairs. As well as 
providing information to creditors, the statement of affairs provides a 
basis for the liquidator's conduct of the liquidation. It is unlikely that a 
liquidator who has prepared a statement will be alert to information 
which would suggest that the contents of the statement are inaccurate 
or incomplete. The liquidator is more likely to approach a statement 
prepared by a director with a more discerning eye. 
As far as comfort available to creditors in terms of sanctions is 
concerned, the position is effectively the same in the case of a 
liquidator preparing the statement as where a director prepares it. 
Under current law, defaulting directors are subject to an ongoing fine, 
94 unrep. Christchurch , M9/76, Casey J 
95 under section 300 of the Act 
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In addition, if they produce a statement which is false or misleading 
they are liable upon conviction to a fine of up to $1 OOO, or a prison 
sentence of up to two years96. The creditors therefore have the 
comfort of both the coercive and the deterrent provisions. The 
sanctions available against a liquidator recognise the fact that 
liquidators do not have the same motivation to mislead creditors that 
directors facing personal liability would have. If a liquidator failed to 
prepare the statement of affairs, a creditor would, however, have the 
ability to apply to the court under section 286 for failure to comply. 
VI IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE UPON DUTIES AND POWERS OF 
LIQUIDATORS ON PROTECTION OF CREDITORS 
A. Interim Liquidators 
Essentially, the 1993 Act carries through the current law relating to the 
appointment of provisional liquidators prior to the making of a winding 
up order97. While the 1955 Act does not expressly restrict the 
provisional liquidator to lesser powers than those conferred on a 
liquidator proper, it does confer the power on the court to limit and 
restrict the provisional liquidator's powers. It is now clear that a 
provisional liquidator's primary duty is "to preserve the status qua with 
the least possible harm to all concerned so as to enable the Court to 
decide after a proper and final hearing whether or not the company 
should be wound up"98. The new Act embodies this common law 
position in the language of section 246. An interim liquidator has 
rights and powers "to the extent necessary or desirable to maintain the 
value of assets owned or managed by the company"99. In addition, the 
court may limit the interim liquidator's powers further100. 
96 Ss 461 and 461 E Companies Act 1955 
97 s. 234 Companies Act 1955 
98 Re Chateau Hotels Limited [1977] 1 NZLR 381 , per Roper J 
99 s. 246(2) 
100 s. 246(3) 
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The key words of the provision are "maintain the value of assets". It 
has been commented in submissions to the Minister of Justice101 that 
the clause unduly restricts the powers of the interim liquidator, and in 
particular does not enable the interim liquidator to sell assets which 
will reduce in value prior to the date of the winding up order. However, 
in the writer's view the clause does not so restrict the abilities of the 
interim liquidator. The words "maintain the value" clearly confer the 
power to sell assets, if doing so will maintain their value. This view is 
borne out by the words of the Law Commission in its Report102, which 
notes: "The use of 'value' clarifies that the liquidator is not required to 
preserve assets if their value is declining; he or she may, for example, 
sell perishable goods, thereby preserving their value". 
B. Supervision of the Liquidator by Creditors 
As discussed above, sections 243 to 245 of the 1993 Act reintroduce 
the ability of creditors to exercise control over the appointment of the 
liquidator, and the conduct of the liquidation. The clauses were 
inserted into the second draft of the Bill after sharp reaction to their 
absence in the first draft Bil11°3 (ref). It is unfortunate that the drafting 
of these provisions is not particularly clear, and involves references to 
several other clauses scattered throughout Part XVI of the new Act in 
order to understand the relatively simple procedure they set out. 
In the case of companies put into liquidation by shareholders or the 
Board (essentially voluntarily) the starting point is a decision as to 
whether or not the directors can complete a declaration of solvency. 
The declaration required from the Board under this provision should be 
easier to satisfy than the declaration required under the 1955 Act. 
Under present law the directors are required to make a "forecast" of 
the company's liquidity over the next 12 months104; whereas the 1993 
101 Submission dated 1 March, 1993 from the Society of Accountants and dated 25 February 1993 from 
KPMG Peat Marwick 
102 Above n.2 para 663 
103 In submissions to the Select Committee 
104 s. 27 4 Companies Act 1955 
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Act105 requires a declaration of its ability to pay debts at one point in 
time only - at the time the liquidator is appointed. The directors voting 
in favour of the declaration must certify as to their view and the 
reasons for it. If such a declaration is made, the liquidator is not 
required to comply with section 243. 
Creditors of a solvent company do not require the protection afforded 
by the provision where they will be paid out in full. As discussed 
throughout this paper, the new Act does not consistently carry through 
the position that creditors of solvent companies in liquidation do not 
have an interest in the liquidation. 
However, section 244 may then assume significance. This is 
essentially a re-enactment of the present position under the 1955 
Act106, and provides that the liquidator must call a meeting of creditors 
if he or she discovers that the directors' certificate was not given on 
reasonable grounds, or that the company cannot pay its due debts. 
Where the liquidation is insolvent and commenced "voluntarily", the 
liquidator must call a meeting of creditors to determine whether to 
resolve to appoint a new liquidator107. The creditors can also 
determine at that meeting whether to pass a resolution specifying a 
time or times that creditors' meetings should be held108. 
If the liquidation is court-ordered, the liquidator must call a meeting of 
creditors to determine whether to apply to court for the appointment of 
another liquidator. If such a resolution is passed, the first liquidator 
must then apply to court for an order accordingly109. In the writer's 
view, the need for the liquidator to make an application to court adds 
unnecessarily to the time and expense of the liquidation, and goes 
against the thrust of the reforms, which is to simplify the liquidation 
process. As the Society of Accountants points out in its submission to 
105 s. 243 Companies Act 1993 
106 s. 279 Companies Act 1955 
107 s. 243(1)(a) Companies Act 1993 
108 s. 243(c) and s.258 Companies Act 1993 
109 s. 243(7) 
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the Minister of Justice110, at present it takes three to four months to get 
such an application before the court in Auckland. 
As with the Companies Act 1955, the fact that not all companies 
wound up by the Court are insolvent is not addressed in these 
provisions. Thus, in the case of solvent, involuntary liquidations, 
creditors are provided with a protection they do not need, and the 
expense and time of the liquidation is increased accordingly. The fact 
that all creditors will be paid out would be a factor that a liquidator 
would be entitled to take into account in deciding whether to call a 
meeting of creditors; however the creditors retain the ability to insist on 
the meeting if they so wish111 . 
The important exceptions under the 1955 Act to the obligation to call a 
meeting of creditors are carried through to the Act112. In the writer's 
view this ability of the liquidator to exercise a discretion not to call a 
meeting is a useful and pragmatic power and, balanced by the ability 
of creditors to force the liquidator to call the meeting, does not unduly 
prejudice the interests of creditors. 
C. Role of the First Liquidator 
In effect then, except in the case of what could be termed a solvent, 
voluntary winding up, upon appointment the first liquidator takes up 
the functions presently automatically conferred on the official 
assignee as provisional liquidator. 
It is important to distinguish between a provisional liquidator 
appointed before the winding up and one appointed upon winding 
up. The former is replaced in the new Act with an interim liquidator. 
There is no equivalent in the new Act of the latter. 
Although there is clear authority under current law prescribing the 
role of a provisional liquidator appointed prior to a winding up order, 
110 Dated 1 March, 1993 
111 cl. 245 
112 s. 245 Companies Act 1993 
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to the effect that the provisional liquidator in those circumstances 
must act only so as to preserve the status quo, the writer has been 
unable to locate any New Zealand authority on how far the official 
assignee, as provisional liquidator appointed after the winding up 
order has been made, may go in administering the liquidation. 
Under the provisions of the 1993 Act, by the time the creditors' 
liquidator is appointed under section 243, in the case of a court-
ordered liquidation, thirty days may have elapsed, and very possibly 
it could be a number of months before a second liquidator is 
appointed; for example if the first liquidator initially sends out 
notices that he or she does not intend to call a meeting under 
section 245, and the creditors then require one to be called. The 
1993 Act does not restrict the ability of the first liquidator to take 
steps in the liquidation. By the time the second liquidator is 
appointed, there may be few or no assets left to administer. 
The failure of the new Act to limit the extent of the powers of the first 
liquidator could give rise to some potentially difficult situations. 
Take the example of the liquidation of company whose only asset is 
a restaurant business. If one willing buyer presents itself to the first 
liquidator after the Court ordered the winding up of the company, 
the first liquidator is faced with the dilemma of having to decide 
whether to conclude the sale on the basis that the price offered is 
the best available, and an opportunity which may not repeat itself; 
or delaying the sale until the creditors have an opportunity to 
appoint their own liquidator. If the liquidator takes the first course, 
he or she may face liability if the creditors and the second liquidator 
are not in agreement with the sale or its terms. If the liquidator does 
not proceed with the sale he or she may lose the opportunity to sell 
at a good price or altogether, given the delay which may occur 
before the second liquidator is appointed. 
If the liquidator were a "tame" liquidator appointed by resolution of 
the company, it may be that he or she will collude with the 
shareholders, for example by selling the business to the major 
shareholder at an undervalue. By the time the creditors' liquidator 
is appointed, although there is the opportunity to detect the 
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collusion, the creditors will nevertheless bear the cost of rectifying 
the situation. 
It is suggested that there are two possible solutions to this problem -
firstly, the ability of the first liquidator to take major steps in the 
liquidation could be restricted. This would seem to give meaning to 
the ability of the creditors to have their own liquidator appointed in 
the first place. Alternatively, or in addition, the time limit within 
which the creditors' meeting held under section 243 could be 
shortened considerably. In relation to Court-ordered windings up it 
is suggested that there should be no need for the liquidator to have 
to apply to the Court for the replacement liquidator. Given that the 
1993 Act attempts to simplify the procedure and do away with the 
distinctions between the different sorts of liquidations, there does 
not seem any good reason why creditors should need to apply to 
Court in the case of court-ordered liquidations, but not in those 
which commenced with a resolution of the company. In addition, 
this contention seems to be supported by the policy of reducing the 
role of the Court in the case of court-ordered liquidations. 
D. The Committee of Inspection 
As discussed above, under the 1955 Act, a liquidator may not 
undertake certain actions without first obtaining the sanction of the 
court or alternatively, the committee of inspection. Most other 
jurisdictions surveyed above contain a similar level of supervision 
by either of those bodies as that provided for in the 1955 Act. The 
exception is Australia, which nevertheless maintains the need for 
sanction for major contracts or compromises. The new Act, in its 
removal of all need for sanctions, is therefore unique, and in the 
writer's view poses an unnecessary risk to the protection of the 
rights of creditors of insolvent companies11 3, as well as sometimes 
putting a liquidator in an invidious position114. The removal of the 
need to constantly revert to court, with the time and expense 
inherent in such applications, will no doubt be welcomed by 
113 As discussed above, this is not a problem for creditors of solvent companies 
11 4 As will be discussed in the context of a fact example, below 
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creditors and liquidators alike. The Law Commission identified the 
need to constantly revert to court as the single greatest criticism of 
the current regime115. However, removing such protection for 
creditors can only be justified if more flexible and effective 
accountability of the liquidator to the creditors is provided for. 
It is the writer's view that the provisions of the 1993 Act do not 
provide watertight protection for creditors. As discussed above, in a 
large percentage of liquidations where the company is very 
insolvent, liquidators are permitted not to call a meeting of creditors, 
and are not obliged to forward an initial report and statement of 
affairs to creditors116 . In such situations it becomes advantageous 
for a liquidation committee to be appointed, in order to ensure that 
the actions of the liquidator are monitored, and that the rest of the 
creditors are kept informed. The success of the powers of creditors 
to prevent or attack an action of the liquidator is dependent on the 
creditors receiving timely information. The committee or the 
creditors can then make application to court under sections 284 or 
286 of the Act for an order directing a liquidator not to undertake a 
certain action, or an order in respect of a failure to comply. 
However, a liquidation committee has no positive power over a 
liquidator under the 1993 Act, in the way that it does under the 
current Act. The I iquidator is bound to report to it, 11 7 but may 
continue to act against those views in his or her discretion. It is not 
clear on what basis the committee of inspection has the power of 
sanction under the current Act - whether in its own right or 
delegated from the court. It is clear that the Law Commission 
proceeded on the basis that if the court does not have the power to 
sanction, then it follows that the committee of inspection cannot hold 
such power: "The reduced role of the Court also means that 
committees of inspection, which can be a substitute for the Court 
(section 240 of the 1955 Act) , have a different role". 
11 5 Above, n.2 para 624 
11 6 s. 255 Companies Act 1993 
11 7 s. 315 Companies Act 1993 
40 
However, it can be argued that the absence of a delegating power 
equivalent to section 266 of the 1955 Act which delegates certain 
powers of the court to the liquidator indicates that the power to 
sanction is conferred upon the liquidation committee in its own right. 
In any event, there is no reason why such power could not be 
conferred upon a liquidation committee. Very extensive powers are 
conferred on committees of inspection under US Chapter 11 
reconstructions in order to relieve the courts and the other parties 
involved from the need to obtain sanction from the courts 
constantly118. The ability of the liquidation committee to sanction 
the more risky actions of liquidators would appear to be one solution 
to the practical difficulties inherent in applying to court for sanction. 
In the writer's view the power to sanction is a more effective check 
on the liquidators' duties than that provided by sections 284 and 
286. The balance struck in the Law Commission Bill rested on the 
one hand on the expertise of an objective and insolvency 
practitioner. This balance has been removed in the 1993 Act, and 
in the writer's opinion could be restored by the ability of the 
creditors to sanction the acts of liquidators. Rights of application to 
court after the liquidator has acted incur expense, and will rarely 
restore creditors to the position they would have been in if the 
liquidator had not acted contrary to their interests. 
VI PRACTICAL EXAMPLE 
A The Facts 
A Limited has been placed into liquidation by way of court order at the 
suit of the Department of Inland Revenue for non-payment of GST (not 
a preferential debt) A Limited carried on a tomato dehydrating 
business. It exported dried tomatoes. A Limited's major asset (in fact 
virtually its only asset) is a dehydrating machine which it bought from 
an Australian firm called Dry Out Limited about eighteen months ago. 
The machine was purchased by way of an agreement whereby A 
Limited paid a deposit to Dry Out, and the balance (with interest at the 
11 8 See Blain and O'Gawa Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: 
Creation, Composition, Powers, and Duties 1990 Marquette Law Review, p.581 
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market rate) by equal monthly instalments thereafter. A Limited now 
has about 70% equity in the dehydrator, although its overall value has 
depreciated considerably . Dry Out has an Instrument by Way of 
Security over the dehydrator. 
The creditors of A Limited are: 
Secured Creditors 
Preferential Creditors 
Unsecured Creditors 
TOTAL 
The company's assets are: 
Miscellaneous chattels 
Dehydrating machine 
TOTAL 
SHORTFALL 
(Dry Out) 
Wages 
ACC 
(trade creditors and unpaid 
rental) 
(IRD) 
$100,000 
$15,000 
$15,000 
$15,000 
$15,000 
$160,000 
$600.00 
$135,000 
$135,600 
$ 24.400 
The realisation of the dehydrator is therefore crucial to the ability of the 
creditors to obtain any dividend in the liquidation. 
A Limited's major shareholder (80%) is B Limited, its other 
shareholders are its three directors. They are also the directors of B 
Limited. 
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B Limited owns the premises from which A Limited operated, and 
leases them to A Limited. B Limited has not filed a claim in the 
liquidation, and it appears that A Limited has kept up to date with its 
rental payments. A Limited also leased a small office from another firm 
in the city, since its factory premises are a little way out of town. 
Unfortunately it has fallen well behind on its rent, and in addition it has 
failed to maintain the office, which was extensively damaged at last 
year's Christmas party. 
B Limited claims that the dehydrating machine is fixed to the land, and 
is therefore a landlord's fixture, rather than a chattel available in the 
liquidation. B Limited has erected a fence around the machine so that 
it cannot be removed. However, it appears to the liquidator from her 
own observation, and a quick skim through a couple of law books that 
this claim by B Limited appears to be quite spurious. 
B. Meeting of Creditors 
Upon appointment by the court, perhaps as a nominee of the 
petitioning creditor, perhaps from a court list, the liquidator must 
consider whether to call a meeting of creditors under section 243, and 
whether to prepare a statement of affairs and initial report under cl 
255. The liquidator is required to make a judgement call on this issue. 
If the major asset of the company in liquidation is recovered, the 
unsecured creditors are likely to receive well in excess of twenty cents 
in the dollar, and there would not appear any reason for the liquidator 
to consider, on the grounds set out in section 245 that no meeting of 
creditors should be held. On the other hand, if the dehydrator cannot 
be recovered (remembering that there are insufficient assets in the 
estate to fund any proceedings), the return to the unsecured creditors 
will be less than the twenty cents in the dollar mark, and the liquidator 
may consider that the calling of a meeting of creditors to make an 
election on the appointment of another liquidator is not justified given 
the very low level of easily realisable assets in the estate. However, 
the position is made easier for the liquidator under the new Act than it 
would be under current law, as she will be entitled to appoint a solicitor 
early on in order to assess the strength of the company's title to the 
dehydrator, without the need to obtain sanction of the court or the 
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creditors to advise on whether or not the major asset of the company in 
liquidation is recoverable. This will assist the liquidator in forming a 
view as to the likelihood of succeeding in realising the dehydrator, and 
thus the feasibility of calling a creditors meeting. 
Assuming that the legal advice is that there is an excellent chance 
of retaining ownership of the dehydrator, the liquidator will probably 
go ahead and call a creditors' meeting, after first compiling a 
statement of affairs, an initial report for creditors and settling a list of 
creditors. However, in the meantime, the liquidator's solicitor is 
likely to provide legal advice that in order to ensure that the 
dehydrator is not dealt with by B Limited on the basis of its claimed 
landlord's lien, it is necessary to apply to court for an order 
restraining it from so doing until the issue of ownership has been 
resolved between the parties. The liquidator faces the decision of 
whether to wait until the creditors have had an opportunity to affirm 
her appointment, or to seek the appointment of another nominee. 
In this case, because the order would have the effect of preserving 
the asset, and thus the status quo, it would be quite proper for the 
liquidator to go ahead and apply for the order without recourse to 
the creditors. More difficult for the liquidator would be the decision 
if an offer to buy the dehydrator were received at this time. 
Obviously any acceptance of such an offer would have to be 
conditional on the successful outcome of the challenge to B 
Limited's claim for a landlord's lien, but given the fact that the 
market for such machinery is very limited in New Zealand, the first 
liquidator is placed in a difficult position. In order to protect herself 
against future claims by the creditors, the liquidator could make an 
application to court for an order directing her to sell the asset for the 
price offered. Such an application would need to be supported by a 
valuation. In that way, both the creditors and the liquidator are 
protected. However, there is no obligation on the first liquidator to 
make such an application, since her powers and discretion are not 
limited in any way, and creditors therefore face the risk of the 
liquidator dealing with the asset in a manner potentially adverse to 
their interests, before creditors are fully advised of the facts or have 
had an opportunity to make their views known. 
11 9 Above, n.80 
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C. Secured Creditors 
Assuming that the asset has been preserved by court order, and a 
creditors' meeting is held, the liquidator (either the liquidator originally 
appointed by the court or one appointed at the instance of the 
creditors) must ascertain the position of the secured creditors, Dry Out 
Limited. The ability of the secured creditor to stand aloof from the 
liquidation, relied upon by Williamson J in the Your Size Fashions 
decision119, while it remains in the 1993 Act, has been circumscribed. 
Under present law, the rights of secured creditors are found under s. 
90 of the Insolvency Act (which applies by virtue of s. 307 of the 
Companies Act) . Under section 90, a secured cred itor presently has 
three options: 
i. to realise the security, and to prove for the balance; or 
ii. to surrender the security and prove for the whole debt, 
ranking equally with general creditors and losing the right to 
interest on the debt. There is a right, under certain conditions, 
to withdraw the surrender, or submit a fresh proof of debt; or 
iii . to give an estimate of the value of the security to the 
liquidator who can pay that value or sell the charged asset and 
pay the proceeds to the secured creditor. The secured creditor 
then has the right to prove in the liquidation for any shortfall 
between the estimated value and the proceeds of sale. 
Section 305(1 ), (2) and (3) substantially carries through this position, 
and liquidators will no doubt welcome the fact that the provisions are 
now clearly spelt out in the Companies Act. However, under section 
305(8), the liquidator can force a secured creditor to make an election 
under section 305(1 ), by serving the creditor with notice that with in 20 
days of the notification, the creditor must make an election. Failure to 
do so results in the deeming of the secured creditor to have 
surrendered the security to the liquidator for the general benefit of all 
creditors. 
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Section 305(8) represents a marked erosion of the rights of secured 
creditors. The secured creditor may be forced to take action in relation 
to the asset within a very short time frame. Conceivably a liquidator 
could call for an election soon after appointment. A liquidator may 
well be attracted to clarifying the stance of the secured creditors at the 
beginning of the liquidation process, in order to plan the progress of 
the administration of the liquidation. Even though the liquidator is not 
obliged to settle the list of creditors for up until 30 days after the date 
the liquidation commenced120, the identity of the secured creditors is 
readily available from both the company's list of charges, and from the 
register of charges on the company's file at the Companies Office121 . 
There us nothing preventing the liquidator from serving notice under 
section 305(8) on the secured creditors before the list of creditors is 
settled under section 255, or before sending out the report required to 
be sent to all creditors under section 255(2)(c)(ii). Indeed, the 
liquidator may wish to force the secured creditors to make the election 
in order to assist her in compiling the portion of the report relating to 
proposals for the conduct of the liquidation122. 
The secured creditor may be in the position of having to make an 
election without the benefit of the liquidator's information as to the 
state of the company's affairs, some of which may be relevant to which 
election she may make. For example, a secured creditor who has 
security over a specialised piece of equipment, which is an integral 
part of the company in liquidation's operations, and for which there 
may be little demand on the open market if sold in isolation, may wish 
to know whether the liquidator proposes to sell all of the plant as a 
unit, since this may be relevant to the decision whether to leave the 
asset with the liquidator and claim for its value, or to realise the asset 
outside of the rest of the liquidation. The ability, in section 305(10), to 
later rely on the charge, (even in the case of a deemed surrender) , 
120 s. 255 Companies Act 1993 
121 Note that under the previous draft Bill the secured creditors were obliged to notify the liquidator of the 
existence of a charge, presumably in anticipation of the proposed legislation which it is envisaged will 
remove the register of company charges from the Companies office; however this requirement was removed 
in the later draft of the Bill. 
122 Required under s. 255 
123 Above, n.80 
124 Cl. 305(6)(b) 
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does not assist the secured creditor who is forced to make an early 
election, in the absence of all material information, and elects to rely 
on the charge, and to realise the asset outside of the liquidation, In 
practice, most secured creditors rely on their charge, but the case of 
Your Size Fashions123 is an illustration of the fact that this is not always 
so, even in the case of large, institutional lenders. 
The change of the language in clause 268(6) of the second draft of the 
Bill (which is the direct predecessor of section 305(7) of the 1993 Act) 
from that of cl 268(7) in the first draft of the Bill is also significant. The 
first draft imposed, in circumstances when the secured creditor makes 
a claim, an obligation on the liquidator to redeem, or realise the 
charge, or to reject the claim. In other words, the liquidator is obliged 
to take some positive step when a claim is made by a secured creditor. 
By contrast, section 305(7) in the 1993 Act, based on the later draft of 
the Bill, imposes no such obligation, but uses the word "may" in 
respect of redemption, and is silent on the ability of the liquidator to 
realise the asset. The liquidator is therefore not obliged to take any 
steps in respect of an asset in relation to which the secured creditor 
has elected under section 305(1 )(b). The effect of this omission 
renders section 305(1 )(b) at best a risky option for secured creditors, 
in that they have no guarantee that their security will be redeemed, 
and at worst an expensive waste of time. The expense of obtaining a 
valuation and perhaps also a revised valuation124, and the time 
involved in doing so may fatally affect the secured creditor's ability to 
obtain value for the asset if the liquidator chooses not to act on the 
valuation, as she is entitled to do under section 305(7). There is no 
obligation on the liquidator to give the secured creditor notice that she 
does not intend to redeem the security. Nor is there a time limit within 
which the liquidator must make her decision. The clause allows the 
liquidator to redeem "at any time". In addition, it is unclear whether the 
secured creditor would be entitled to elect any of the other options 
described in clause 268(1) in the event that the liquidator chooses not 
to redeem the security, and practically this may not be possible if the 
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delay on the liquidator's part is too great. Dry Out Limited should think 
twice about exercising this option. 
Nor is clause 305(7) ideal from the liquidator's point of view. While it 
gives the liquidator carte blanche to take no action in respect of the 
claim, if the liquidator decides to take action, the only option available 
to her is to redeem the security. The option of realising the asset, 
available under current law 125 and under the provision's 
predecessor126 is not carried through to the reported-back version of 
the Bill. Clause 268(7) of the first draft of the Bill provided: 
Where a claim is made by a creditor as a secured creditor, the 
liquidator must -
(b) Realise the property subject to the charge and pay the 
secured creditor the lesser of the amount of the claim and 
the net amount realised taking into account the liquidator's 
reasonable remuneration. 
The valuation procedure in section 305, based on the amended clause 
268 of the second draft of the Bill , with the onus on a liquidator to 
accept a valuation, places a heavy responsibility on a liquidator, and a 
commensurate risk on the other creditors of the liquidation. The 
secured creditor would obviously submit the highest valuation 
possible, and takes the risk that the valuation is lower than the price 
he would have received if he had elected to realise the asset himself. 
That is the risk, it is suggested, which should properly lie with the 
secured creditor, since other, less risky options are available to him, if 
he so chooses. If the liquidator accepts a valuation which is too high, 
and is bound to redeem the asset at that value, the return to the other 
creditors of the company's estate is reduced by the amount of the 
excess of the valuation over what the liquidator eventually realises the 
asset for. To counter this risk, the liquidator would no doubt wish to 
obtain her own valuation of the asset127. Given that the liquidator is 
unlikely to accept a valuation of the secured creditor which exceeds 
the liquidator's own valuation, the expense of obtaining two valuations 
125 s. 90 Insolvency Act 1967 
126 cl. 268(7) of the first draft Bill 
127 the liquidator would no doubt obtain a valuation at some stage of the liquidation in any event, before 
realising the asset 
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is pointless. In many cases, the liquidator would prefer to realise the 
asset128, and pay the secured creditor the lesser of the valuation or the 
amount realised. This approach seems fairer to all concerned - it puts 
the risk on to the secured creditor where it properly lies in this context, 
and it protects the liquidator and the other creditors of the estate. In 
this case, given Dry Out's geographical distance from the asset, and 
the lack of a ready market for it, it is very possible that it will elect to 
surrender the asset, and claim in the liquidation. 
D. Issuing Proceedings 
If the secured creditor has surrendered the security, the liquidator 
must consider issuing proceedings against B Limited for recovery of 
the dehydrator. The only chance for creditors to receive a dividend 
in the estate is for such proceedings to succeed. Unfortunately, 
there is only $600, representing the proceeds of realisation of the 
company in liquidation's miscellaneous assets, available to fund 
such litigation. The liquidator must therefore approach creditors to 
ascertain whether they wish to contribute towards a "fighting fund" 
for such litigation. It is unlikely that the smaller trade creditors or 
the Department of Inland Revenue will be willing to contribute to 
funding the proceedings if Dry Out Limited refuses to contribute 
also, given that under the pari passu rule, Dry Out will receive the 
bulk of the any recovery by way of dividend in the estate. If the 
creditors refuse to fund the proceedings, it is the writer's view that 
the liquidator is not bound to issue them, no matter what the 
prospects of success. The creditors have tacitly indicated their 
agreement to the proceedings not being brought, and although 
there does not appear to be any authority on this issue, in the 
writer's opinion, creditors would not succeed in any action for 
breach of the liquidator's duty under 
section 253 on such a basis, and that a court would hold the 
liquidator's failure to bring proceedings reasonable and efficient in 
the circumstances. 
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The position would be different if it appeared to the liquidator that 
there was enough money in the estate to bring the litigation. It 
should be remembered that the decision to issue proceedings often 
exposes either a liquidator to personal liability for costs, or the 
estate and thus the creditors if the proceedings are unsuccessful1 29. 
In general , where an action is to recover a debt, the proceedings 
should be brought in the name of the company in liquidation130. It 
also appears to be accepted (although there does not appear to 
have been any judicial consideration of the issue in New Zealand) 
that in the case of proceedings issues in the name of the company, 
the liquidator will not be personally liable for costs. In some 
instances, however, the liquidator must bring proceedings in his or 
her own name. For example, if the liquidator wishes to recover the 
rent paid to 8 Limited, o the basis that it is a voidable preference, 
and may be attacked under section 292 of the 1993 Act, the 
application must be made by the liquidator, because of the express 
wording of the provision: "on the application of the liquidator" 
(emphasis added). It is therefore clear that proceedings issued by 
the liquidator to recover the rent must be issued in the liquidator's 
name. In such circumstances, the liquidator faces personal liability 
for any costs awarded against her, and in practice would seek an 
indemnity for costs from creditors against such an event. 
Because of the lack of available funds in the estate, the creditors in 
this case appear to be no worse off under the 1993 Act than they 
would be under current law. This is because the liquidator is forced 
to consult them on the funding issue, and if issuing proceedings in 
her own name, to seek an indemnity as to costs. The creditors' 
protection would be lessened if there were sufficient money in the 
estate for the liquidator to issue proceedings without recourse to the 
creditors. In this case the liquidator has obtained legal advice, and 
has a good chance of succeeding in any proceedings. In other 
cases, there is nothing to prevent a liquidator from embarking on 
proceedings in a company's name which are ill-advised and could 
129 See Hamilton, Aspects of Official Liquidators' Personal Liability for Costs of Litigation, Company and 
Securities Law Journal , August 1989, page 262 and October 1989, page 301 
130 See Kent & Ors v La Communaute de Soeurs de Charite de la Providence & Ors [1903] AC 220 
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be costly to the company and ultimately the creditors. Again, it is 
those more insolvent companies where the liquidator is exempt from 
the reporting obligations which are most at risk; but even where the 
liquidator is obliged to report on a six-monthly basis, the creditors 
may not be informed in sufficient time to prevent such an action on 
the part of the liquidator. Regular meetings of either creditors or a 
liquidation committee are the best ways of reducing the risk to 
creditors. Better still would have been a requirement that the 
liquidator must obtain sanction of either the liquidation committee, 
or if there is not one, of a meeting of creditors before launching 
proceedings in the company's name. 
E. Disclaimer 
The liquidator will also need to consider whether to disclaim A 
Limited's lease of the city office, where the rent has fallen well into 
arrears, and the building has been damaged. Under current law131 , 
the liquidator would be obliged to seek the leave of the court in 
order to disclaim the lease, and would need to make application 
within a strictly prescribed time limit. A court must be satisfied that 
the property which the liquidator seeks to disclaim is truly "onerous 
property" within the meaning of the provision132. The liquidator is 
not obliged under current law to give notice of the disclaimer to any 
party, although a court can impose such an obligation. 
Under the 1993 Act133 the liquidator has a great deal more 
flexibility. There is no time limit within which she must disclaim the 
property (unless given notice by an affected party under clause 
234A), and there is no need to apply for the leave of the court. As a 
protection for affected parties, though, the liquidator must give 
notice within 10 days of disclaiming to any affected party known to 
her, and such affected persons may either prove in the liquidation or 
apply to court for an order vesting the disclaimed property in them. 
In the writer's view, the new provision does not provide the creditor 
131 s. 312 Companies Act 1955 
132 See Re Potters Oil Ltd (1985) 1 sec 99,384 
133 s. 269 
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who is affected by the disclaimer with the same level of protection 
that the current provisions do. The liquidator has virtually an 
unfettered ability to disclaim, so long as the property falls within the 
definition of onerous property. The discretion of the court to refuse 
to give leave to the liquidator to disclaim has been removed. 
However, for the main body of creditors the new provision is 
beneficial, given the much lower cost and speed to the liquidation of 
notifying affected parties compared to the time and cost of seeking 
leave of the court under current law. 
VII CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined in this paper, the writer's conclusion is that, 
overall, the protection afforded to creditors will be reduced under the 
Companies Act 1993. The simplification into a single procedure of the 
processes specifically designed to take the particular circumstances of 
a liquidation into account (for example its solvency or voluntariness) 
has resulted in a procedure which is not entirely suitable only any type 
of liquidation. As has been discussed in the course of this paper, this 
has given rise to paradoxical results. For example, one of the effects 
of the provisions is that the more solvent a company is when it goes 
into liquidation, the greater the duties on the liquidator to keep 
creditors informed, and to involved in the liquidation process. 
Conversely, in the case of very insolvent liquidations the provisions of 
the new Act permit the liquidator to take absolutely no steps in 
informing and involving the creditors. 
In addition, the position of secured creditors, likely to include the large, 
institutional lenders, has been seriously eroded by the provisions of 
the 1993 Act, and in particular by section 305. 
The goal of simplifying liquidation procedures appears at first glance to 
be a desirable one, with the resulting reduction in the cost of 
complying with complex statutory procedures, and the consequentially 
higher return to creditors. However, there appears to have been little 
analysis in the reform process of whether the merits of such 
simplification, and resulting cost savings outweigh the detriment of the 
134 Above, n. 4. 
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removal of measures designed to protect the interests of creditors. As 
Jack Hodder pointed out in his address to the Law Conference at the 
beginning of 1993134, the hidden costs of such a reform may be great. 
Large international investors have a choice of jurisdictions in which to 
make their investments. Given the fact that New Zealand will now 
offer, relative to the other jurisdictions considered above, relatively 
little protection to creditors, there is a real risk that such investors will 
direct their money elsewhere. 
Whether the problems identified by the writer in the course of this 
paper have, in practice, a significant impact on the commercial 
community remains, of course, to be seen. 
APPENDIX I 
Figure One 
I 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Court 461 674 1205 1197 1232 1368 
Members' 281 524 2751 499 497 380 
Creditors' 67 121 201 178 189 182 
I 
Note that the figure for Members' Voluntary Windings Up was particularly high 
in 1989. This was due to a concessional winding up tax provision, introduced 
that year in order to encourage the winding up of companies that had ceased 
trading 
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